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use#LAATHE DISCIPLINE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AMARTYA SEN*
Abstract
Cost-beneﬁt analysis is a general discipline, based on the use of some founda-
tional principles, which are not altogether controversial, but have nevertheless con-
sidered plausibility. Divisiveness increases as various additional requirements are
imposed. There is a trade-off here between easier usability (through locked-up for-
mulae) and more general acceptability (through allowing parametric variations).
The paper examines and scrutinizes the merits and demerits of these additional re-
quirements. The particular variant of cost-beneﬁt approach that is most commonly
used now is, in fact, extraordinarily limited, because of its insistence on doing the
valuation entirely through an analogy with the market mechanism. This admits only
a narrow class of values, and demands that individuals be unconcerned about many
substantial variations, ignored in the procedure of market valuation. The use, in-
stead, of a general social choice approach can allow greater freedom of valuation
and can also accommodate more informational inputs.
The discipline of cost-beneﬁt analysis—if discipline it is—has fearless
champions as well as resolute detractors. It is, partly, a battle of giants, for
there are heavyweight intellectuals on both sides, wielding powerful weap-
ons of impressively diverse kinds. It is also, partly, a conversation between
great soliloquists—very skilled in making their points, and somewhat less
troubled than Hamlet (‘‘To be,’’ say some, and ‘‘Not to be,’’ announce the
others).
The main object of this paper is not so much to decide who is right but
to identify what the issues are. However, that is not my only objective. I
also have some personal views and assessments, which I shall not hesitate
to present. But principally (and I believe, more importantly) I will try to
isolate the questions that divide us. We can agree on the questions even
when we do not agree on the answers. There are several difﬁcult issues
here, which must be addressed in one way or another.
* Master, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Lamont University Professor Emeritus, Har-
vard University. For helpful comments, I am most grateful to Eric Posner.
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I. The Themes and the Debates
I shall proceed gradually from some basic principles that characterize the
foundations of the general approach of cost-beneﬁt analysis. These elemen-
tary principles would be accepted by many but rejected by some who are
not that way inclined at all. The latter group would, then, have reason to
go no further (given their rejection of one or other of these foundational
cost-beneﬁt principles). However, those who are ready to live with these
foundational principles will then have to consider what additional require-
ments they are willing to consider to make cost-beneﬁt analysis more spe-
ciﬁc and pointed. Any such narrowing will, of course, also make the ap-
proach less ecumenical and permissive. Indeed, the mainstream approach
of cost-beneﬁt analysis uses a formidable set of very exacting requirements,
and we have particular reason to examine these additional conditions. In-
deed, the list of requirements considered here follows the mainstream ap-
proach quite closely, though I shall also brieﬂy refer to alternative possibili-
ties as we go along.
I shall divide these additional demands into three groups: structural de-
mands, evaluative indifferences, and market-centered valuation. To give
away my main theme at the very beginning (this is deﬁnitely not a detective
story), let me list the main headings under which the principles will be con-
sidered, in the sections that follow the more general Section III.
III. Foundational Principles
A. Explicit Valuation
B. Broadly Consequential Evaluation
C. Additive Accounting
IV. Structural Demands
A. Assumed Completeness
B. Full Knowledge or Probabilistic Understanding
C. Noniterative and Nonparametric Valuations
V. Evaluative Indifferences
A. Nonvaluation of Actions, Motives, and Rights
B. Indifference to Intrinsic Value of Freedom
C. Instrumental View of Behavioral Values
VI. Market-Centered Valuation
A. Reliance on Willingness to Pay
B. Sufﬁciency of Potential Compensation
C. Disregard of Social Choice Options
There is, I fear, much ground to cover, but before I try to get on with it,
I would like to make three clariﬁcatory points. First, the term ‘‘cost-beneﬁtDISCIPLINE OF CBA 933
analysis’’ has considerable plasticity and various speciﬁc procedures have
been called by that name (by the protagonists and by others). There is noth-
ing particularly wrong in this permissiveness, so long as terminological
unity is not taken to be the same as conceptual congruence. It is indeed
perfectly possible for someone to accept the foundational outlook of cost-
beneﬁt analysis and yet reject one or more of the requirements imposed by
the structural demands, evaluative indifferences, and market-centered valu-
ation that characterize the mainstream applications. While the literature is
full of repeated applications of a very well-delineated method that incorpo-
rate all these demands, this should not, in itself, be taken to compromise
the claims of other procedures or approaches to be seen as legitimate cost-
beneﬁt analysis.
Second, the acceptance or nonacceptance of the foundational principles
themselves may, in some ways, be as useful a classiﬁcatory device as the
divisions produced by the insistence on all the requirements invoked by the
mainstream methodology. Indeed, there are analysts who see themselves as
defenders of cost-beneﬁt analysis and who accept the foundational princi-
ples of this approach, who nevertheless cannot but be intensely unhappy
with the elaborate methodology of valuation hammered into the main-
stream procedure. If there is room for them too, I should apply for accom-
modation.
Third, the subject has been in vogue for many decades now and has gen-
erated vast literatures, some more oriented toward analytical issues and oth-
ers more concerned with problems of practical application (usually of the
delineated mainstream methodology). Many conceptual issues have re-
ceived attention, and with them I shall be, in one way or another, concerned
in this paper (even though I shall not attempt to make this into a ‘‘survey
paper’’ with references to speciﬁc publications). But cost-beneﬁt analysis—
or a collection of procedures bearing that general name—has also been
used in many practical decisions, generating corresponding literatures. It
would be nice to attempt a comparative assessment of the varieties of par-
ticular methods that have been used and to discuss their respective suitabil-
ity—absolute and comparative—in handling diverse decisional problems in
practice. Whether this is feasible at this time, I do not know. But I do know
that I am not in a position to do this, given the monumental size of the
literature and my own limited knowledge. While I shall not go in that direc-
tion, I mention it nevertheless, since I do believe that it may be quite useful
as an exercise to go from practice to principles, rather than the other way
round (as attempted in this paper). Understanding can come in different
ways, and despite my using only one general line of investigation (based
on assessing the principles involved), I do not intend to deny the relevance
of other ways of getting at these questions.934 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
II. Costs and Benefits in General Reasoning
The basic rationale of cost-beneﬁt analysis lies in the idea that things are
worth doing if the beneﬁts resulting from doing them outweigh their costs.
This is not, of course, by any means, noncontroversial, but before getting
into the controversies, it is useful to see ﬁrst that there is some intelligible
reasoning here. Indeed, we may well puzzle a bit if someone were to tell
us ‘‘This project has little beneﬁt and much cost—let us do it!’’ We would
think that we are entitled to ask ‘‘why?’’ (or, more emphatically, ‘‘why on
earth?’’). Beneﬁts and costs have claims to our attention. Furthermore, it
may even be argued, with some plausibility (though, I believe, not total cer-
tainty), that any ‘‘pro’’ argument for a project can be seen as pointing to
some beneﬁt that it will yield and any ‘‘anti’’ argument must be associated
with some cost.
Indeed, the language of beneﬁts and costs is used by many who would
have nothing to do with cost-beneﬁt analysis as it is standardly practiced.
Consider, for example, the big political debate that is going on in India right
at this time about the big irrigation project called the Narmada Dam, which
will provide water to a great many people but will also drown the homes
of many others (who have been offered what is seen as inadequate or unac-
ceptable compensation). The decision to produce the dam (and to continue
with the project despite the opposition it generated) was, of course, based
on cost-beneﬁt analysis. However, in arguing against the decision, the op-
ponents of it also point to costs, sometimes called ‘‘human costs,’’ that
have been ignored or not adequately considered.1
The framework of costs and beneﬁts has a very extensive reach, going
well beyond the variables that get standardized attention in the usual tech-
niques associated with the application of cost-beneﬁt analysis. Indeed, the
ordinary procedure of considering, in a general way, the beneﬁts and costs
associated with alternative possibilities and then assessing their respective
advantages is usable in a wide variety of problems, from appraising eco-
nomic development or the quality of life to scrutinizing the extent of in-
equality, poverty, or gender disparity.
2
1 For a powerful and strongly reasoned exposition of the case against the dam, see
Arundhati Roy, The Greater Common Good: The Human Cost of Big Dams, 16 (11),
Frontline, June 4, 1999.
2 See, for example, Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality (enlarged ed. 1997) (1973); A.
B. Atkinson, Social Justice and Public Policy (1983); Keith Grifﬁn & John Knight, Human
Development and International Development Strategies for the 1990s (1990); The Quality of
Life (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds. 1993); Women, Culture and Development: A
Study of Human Capabilities (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds. 1995); Develop-
ment with a Human Face (Santosh Mehrotra & Richard Jolly eds. 1997).DISCIPLINE OF CBA 935
III. Foundational Principles
A. Explicit Valuation
Despite the sweeping reach of reasoning invoking costs and beneﬁts,
cost-beneﬁt analysis as a distinct approach (or, more accurately, as a class
of distinct but related approaches) imposes certain restrictions on evaluative
rules and permissive procedures. Perhaps it is appropriate to see the demand
of explicit valuation as the ﬁrst general condition imposed by the discipline.
This is a forceful demand for fuller articulation, which involves the rejec-
tion of a commonly adopted position hallowed by tradition, to wit, that we
may know what is right without knowing why it is right. At the risk of
oversimpliﬁcation, explicit valuation is a part of the insistence on a rational-
ist approach, which demands full explication of the reasons for taking a de-
cision, rather than relying on an unreasoned conviction or on an implicitly
derived conclusion.
Despite its rationalist appeal, explicit valuation as a principle is not with-
out its problems. If one were to insist on this in all personal decisions, life
would be quite unbearably complicated. The making of day-to-day deci-
sions would, then, take more time than would be available for it, and deci-
sional defenses might look terribly pedantic (perhaps even pompous, in
much the same way the wine experts’ specialist recommendations tend to
sound, invoking such notions as the wine’s ‘‘melodic quality’’ or ‘‘big
nose’’ or ‘‘innate cheerfulness’’).
However, public decisions have more need for explicitness than private
choices or personal actions. Others not involved in the decision may legiti-
mately want to know why exactly something—rather than another—is be-
ing chosen. The demands of accountability apply not merely to implementa-
tion but also to choices of projects and programs. There is, thus, a case for
fuller articulation and more explicit valuation in public decisions than in
private ones.
Here too there may be problems. What Cass Sunstein calls ‘‘incom-
pletely theorized agreements’’ may be quite important for agreed public de-
cisions.3 A consensus on public decisions may ﬂourish so long as the exact
grounds for that accord are not very precisely articulated. Explicit valuation
may, thus, have its problems in public decisions as well as private ones.
There is, nevertheless, a case for explicitness, if only to encourage the
possibility of reasoned consent and to present some kind of a barrier against
implicit railroading of unacceptable decisions that would be widely rejected
if properly articulated. There are several conﬂicting issues of pragmatic
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conﬂict (1996).936 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
concern as well as analytical clarity in the insistence on explicit valuation,
but judged as a technique of analysis (as opposed to rhetoric of advocacy)
this insistence does have some very basic merit. Also, diverse grounds for
agreement on a particular policy judgment can be accommodated within a
general approach of relying on the intersection of partly divergent rankings
over policy alternatives (on which more later—in Section IV).
4
B. Broadly Consequential Evaluation
A second basic principle of cost-beneﬁt analysis relates to the use of con-
sequential evaluation. Costs and beneﬁts are evaluated, in this approach, by
looking at the consequences of the respective decisions. Broadly conse-
quential evaluation allows the relevant consequences to include not only
such things as happiness or the fulﬁllment of desire on which utilitarians
tend to concentrate, but also whether certain actions have been performed
or particular rights have been violated. This inclusiveness is resisted by
some. Since consequentialist thinking has been very closely linked with
utilitarianism and related approaches, there is a long tradition of taking a
very narrow view of what can count as consequences (roughly in line with
what utilitarians wish to focus on).
As a result, many political theorists have argued against taking an inclu-
sive view of consequentialism. It has been claimed, for example, that a per-
formed action cannot be included among the consequences of that action.
But one has to be quite a pure theorist to escape the elementary thought
that an action that has been successfully undertaken must have resulted in
that action’s occurrence, no matter what other consequences it may or may
not have (the main argument against asserting this may be the difﬁculty in
stating something quite so obvious, without sounding rather foolish).5
Similarly, if recognized rights are violated by particular actions (for ex-
ample, by the jailing of dissidents), there is no great difﬁculty in seeing that
these actions have resulted in the violation of those rights. We do not even
face a tremendous intellectual challenge in understanding such statements
as, ‘‘1976 was a very bad year for civil rights in India, since there were
4 On the use of intersection partial orderings, see also Sen, supra note 2; and Amartya
Sen, Employment, Technology and Development (1975).
5 There are interesting issues of agent-relative ethics that are sometimes thought to be in-
compatible with consequential reasoning. But even this rather more sophisticated claim is
hard to entertain except through a slightly disintegrated attempt to get to agent-relative action
judgments starting from agent-independent judgments on states. Once that bit of implicit
schizophrenia is eschewed, the reach of broad consequential reasoning is correspondingly
extended to permit agent relativity in evaluating actions as well as states; on this see Amartya
Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1982); Amartya Sen, Well-Being, Agency
and Freedom: Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. Phil. 169 (1985).DISCIPLINE OF CBA 937
many violations of civil rights as a consequence of policies that were fol-
lowed during the so-called ‘Emergency period.’’’ The vast majority of the
Indian voters who defeated the proposed continuation of the Emergency (as
well as the government that had imposed it) did not have to manage without
consequential reasoning. Indeed, looking at consequences on rights and
freedoms—though allegedly alien to rights-based reasoning in some mod-
ern political theories—is not really a new departure, as anyone studying
Tom Paine’s Rights of Man or Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Vindication of
the Rights of Women (both published in 1792) can readily check.
Taking a broad view of consequential evaluation does not, however,
make it nonassertive. It wrestles against deciding on actions on grounds of
their ‘‘rightness’’—irrespective of their consequences. This is a debate that
has gone on for a long time and remains active today. Those opposed to
consequential evaluation—even in its broadest form—have shared a com-
mon rejection of being guided by consequences (the ‘‘right’’ action may be
determined, in this view, simply by one’s ‘‘duty’’—irrespective of conse-
quences). But they have often argued for very different substantive posi-
tions on deontological grounds. For example, Mahatma Gandhi’s deonto-
logical insistence on nonviolence irrespective of consequences clashes
substantially with Krishna’s deontological advocacy, in Bhagavadgeeta, of
the epic hero Arjuna’s duty to take part in a just war. On the eve of the
great battle, as Arjuna rebels against ﬁghting (on the grounds that many
people will be killed on both sides, that many of them are people for whom
Arjuna has affection and respect, and, furthermore, that he himself—as the
leading warrior on his side—would have to do a lot of killing), Krishna
points to Arjuna’s duty to ﬁght, irrespective of his evaluation of the conse-
quences. It is a just cause, and as a warrior and a general on whom his side
must rely, Arjuna cannot, in Krishna’s view, waver from his obligations.
Krishna’s high deontology has been deeply inﬂuential in Indian moral
debates in the subsequent millennia. It is also eloquently endorsed, among
others, by T. S. Eliot, in a poem in the Four Quartets. Eliot summarizes
Krishna’s view in the form of an admonishment: ‘‘And do not think of the
fruit of action. / Fare forward.’’ Eliot explains: ‘‘Not fare well, / But fare
forward, voyagers.’’6 Cost-beneﬁt analysis, on the other hand, suggests that
we try to ‘‘fare well’’ and not just ‘‘forward.’’ The ‘‘wellness’’ that results
must take note inter alia of the badness of violation of rights and duties (if
such things are admitted into consideration), but the decision cannot be re-
duced just to doing one’s ‘‘duty, irrespective of consequences.’’
6 T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 31 (1944) (The Dry Salvages). I have discussed the issues
involved in this debate in Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97
J. Phil. (in press, 2000).938 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
It should, thus, be clear that consequential evaluation as a principle does
impose a demand with some cutting power. I would argue that the principle
does make good sense, but I know that deontologists would not agree and
would, no doubt, decide that they have overwhelming reasons to reject that
approach (the world is full of ‘‘very strange and well-bred’’ things, to use
William Congreve’s perplexed phrase). The world of costs and beneﬁts
(which includes taking note of the badness of nasty actions and of violation
of freedoms and rights) is quite a different decisional universe from the
sledgehammer reasoning of consequence-independent duties and obliga-
tions.
C. Additive Accounting
Cost-beneﬁt analysis not only bases decisions on costs and beneﬁts, it
also looks for the value of net beneﬁts after deducting costs from beneﬁts.
While beneﬁts can be of different kinds and are put together—to the extent
that they can be—through a selection of weights (or ranges of weights),
costs are seen as forgone beneﬁts. Thus, beneﬁts and costs are deﬁned, ulti-
mately, in the same ‘‘space.’’
The additive form is implicit in all this. When different kinds of beneﬁts
are added together, with appropriate weights, the framework is clearly one
of addition. It may be wondered whether there is anything to discuss here,
since many people are so exclusively familiar with the additive form of rea-
soning (compared with all other possible forms) that addition may appear
to be simply the natural form—perhaps even the only form—for getting
together diverse beneﬁts and costs. However, multiplicative forms have also
been used in the evaluative literature (for example, by J. F. Nash in what
he called ‘‘the bargaining problem’’).7 Other forms are possible too.
In fact, there is a strong case for using concave functions that respond
positively to beneﬁts (and thus negatively to costs) but do not have constant
weights and a linear format. In fact, concavity is very often the most plausi-
ble shape of an objective function involving different good things and has
been used to derive variable weights at different points and correspondingly
variable shadow prices of resources (for example, through use of the so-
called Kuhn-Tucker Theorem).
8 In fact, in general we would expect some
strict concavity (or at least strict quasi concavity, corresponding to dimin-
7 See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950).
8 See H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker, eds., 1 & 2 Contributions to the Theory of Games
(1950, 1953); Samuel Karlin, 1 Mathemetical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming
and Economics (1959). The relevance of concave—as opposed to strictly linear—program-
ming for cost-beneﬁt analysis in general and for shadow pricing in particular is discussed in
Amartya Sen, Choice of Techniques (3d ed. 1968).DISCIPLINE OF CBA 939
ishing marginal rates of substitution between different kinds of beneﬁts),
and in this sense, the additive form of cost-beneﬁt analysis requires careful
handling. One way of dealing with the problem is to conﬁne attention to
relatively marginal changes, so that the weights may not change very much
and the framework may be approximately linear (some would refer to Tay-
lor’s Theorem and to local approximations, at this point). But many projects
are relatively large, and the beneﬁts may be so particularized (especially in
a distribution-sensitive accounting) that the weights may have to change
quite readily. In that case, there is no alternative—if one were to use the
additive form of cost-beneﬁt analysis—to taking note of the need for vary-
ing weights as the magnitudes of different kinds of beneﬁts change. The
exercise must then take the form of a conjoint determination of quantities
of beneﬁts and their weights. I shall not go further into the technicalities
here, but it is important to recognize that the additive form that cost-beneﬁt
analysis adopts is chosen at the cost of some limitation and certainly calls
for more simultaneous reasoning of quantities and values as substantial al-
terations are considered.
Even with all these qualiﬁcations (explicit valuation, broadly consequen-
tial reasoning, and additive accounting), general cost-beneﬁt analysis is a
very ecumenical approach. It is compatible, for example, with weights
based on willingness to pay as well as some quite different ways of valua-
tion (for example, through questionnaires), which may supplement or sup-
plant that willingness-to-pay framework.
9 There is reasoning here of great
generality (despite the qualiﬁcations and disclaimers already considered),
and it is important to see the reach of the general approach before we go
on—from this point onward—to adding more and more restrictive require-
ments that make the procedures more speciﬁc and particular, at the cost of
reducing the wide freedom given by the general approach of taking deci-
sions by cost-beneﬁt reasoning.
IV. Structural Demands
A. Assumed Completeness
As it is standardly practiced, cost-beneﬁt analysis tends to invoke com-
pleteness of evaluations. This requires not only that each consequence be
identiﬁed and known (more on this presently) but also that the weights, at
9 See Partha Dasgupta, Stephen Marglin, & Amartya Sen, Guidelines to Project Evaluation
(prepared for UNIDO, 1972). See also Sen, supra note 8; I. M. D. Little & James Mirrlees,
Manual of Industrial Project Analysis in Developing Countries (1968); Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
(Richard Layard ed. 1972); Amartya Sen, Employment, Technology and Development
(1975); P. S. Dasgupta & G. M. Heal, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources (1979).940 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
the appropriate point, are deﬁnitive and unique. It is often presumed, with-
out any explicit argument, that if we are evaluating beneﬁts and costs, then
every possible state of affairs must be comparable—and be clearly
ranked—vis-a `-vis every other. This presumed requirement has sometimes
been seen by critics of cost-beneﬁt analysis as being quite implausible. How
can we always compare every alternative with every other, especially since
so many considerations are involved, which incorporate imprecise measure-
ment and ambiguous valuation? Can we always ﬁnd a best alternative?
What if we fail to rank some states of affairs vis-a `-vis others?
Some see completeness as a necessary requirement of consequential eval-
uation, but it is, of course, nothing of the sort. A consequentialist approach
does involve the use of maximizing logic in a general form, but maximiza-
tion does not require that all alternatives be comparable and does not even
require that a best alternative be identiﬁable. Maximization only requires
that we do not choose an alternative that is worse than another that can be
chosen instead. If we cannot compare and rank two alternatives, then choos-
ing either from that pair will fully satisfy the requirement of maximization.
The term maximization is often used quite loosely, rather than in its
mathematically well-deﬁned form. Sometimes the term is used to indicate
that we must choose a best alternative. This is, technically, better described
as optimization.
10 The technical deﬁnition of maximization in the founda-
tional literature on set theory and analysis (in the form of picking an alter-
native to which there is none better) captures all that needs to be captured
for being able to choose systematically and cogently through pairwise com-
parisons. Maximization and optimization coincide if the ordering is com-
plete, which it may or may not be. If, for example, it so happens that
(1) there are two options A and B that cannot be ranked vis-a `-vis each
other, but (2) each of them is better than all the other alternatives, then max-
imization would require that one of those two—A or B—be chosen.
11
The distinction can be illustrated with the old story of Buridan’s ass,
which saw two haystacks that it could not rank vis-a `-vis each other.12 Buri-
dan’s ass, as a vigorous optimizer and a great believer in complete order-
10 On the nature of this requirement and its implications, see Amartya Sen, Collective
Choice and Social Welfare, ch. 1* (North-Holland 1979) (1970).
11 This is indeed the way maximality is deﬁned in the mathematical literature, both in pure
set theory (for example, in N. Bourbaki, E ´le ´ments de Mathe ´matique (1939); and Nicholas
Bourbaki, Theory of Sets (English trans. 1968)) and in axiomatic economic analysis (for ex-
ample, in Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value (1959)). The axiomatic connections between max-
imality and optimality are discussed in Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice,
65 Econometrica 745 (1997).
12 There is a more popular but less interesting version of the story of Buridan’s ass, ac-
cording to which it was indifferent between the two haystacks and could not decide which
to choose. However, if the donkey were really indifferent, then either haystack would,DISCIPLINE OF CBA 941
ings, could not choose either haystack (since neither was shown to be
clearly the best), and it thus died of starvation. It starved to death since it
could not rank the two haystacks, but of course each would have generated
a better consequence than starvation. Even if the donkey failed to rank the
two haystacks, it would have made sense—good cost-beneﬁt sense—for it
to choose either rather than neither. Cost-beneﬁt analysis does need maxi-
mization, but not completeness or optimization.
When a particular exercise of cost-beneﬁt analysis ends up with a com-
plete ordering and a clearly optimal outcome (or an optimal set of out-
comes), then that may be ﬁne and good. But if that does not happen, and
the valuational ordering is incomplete, then maximization with respect to
that incomplete ranking is the natural way to proceed. This may yield sev-
eral maximal solutions that are not comparable with each other, and it
would make sense to choose one of them. If the valuations come in the
form of ranges of weights, we can also do sensitivity analysis of the effect
of reducing the ranges of variations on extending the generated partial or-
dering.13 The extent of imprecision can be reﬂected in the assessment, and
the choices can be systematically linked to the valuational ambiguities.
However, in the literature, completeness is sometimes insisted on, which
tends to produce arbitrary completion in terms of imperious valuational
judgments or capricious epistemic assessments. The result often enough is
to ignore the less exactly measured consequences or less clearly agreed val-
ues, even though they may be extremely important (of which we can be
sure even without zeroing in on an exact weight—the entire range of ac-
ceptable valuational weights may speak clearly enough). The neglect of the
so-called human costs relates partly to this despotic quest for complete or-
derings. These are cases in which a little more sophistication in the techni-
cal exercise can allow us to include many variables that some technocrats
ﬁnd too messy to incorporate.
B. Full Knowledge or Probabilistic Understanding
The presumption of full knowledge of the consequences involved is
rather similar to that of complete availability of deﬁnitive and precise valua-
tional weights. It is relevant to see the sources of epistemic ambiguity and
their far-reaching effects. No less importantly, there is a need to consider
clearly, have been as good as the other, and even a resolutely optimizing ass would not have
faced an impasse.
13 The technical connections are discussed in Sen, supra note 10, ch. 7 & 7*; Amartya
Sen, Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability, 38 Econometrica 393 (1970); and
Sen, Employment, Technology and Development, supra note 4. See also the recent literature
on the use of ‘‘fuzzy sets’’ and ‘‘fuzzy valuations.’’942 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
ranges of values of factual variables (like that used for evaluative weights),
which lead mathematically to similarly partial orderings of alternative pro-
posals (on the basis of intersection of all the total orderings compatible with
each set of values within the respective ranges).
14 Again, the discipline of
maximization provides a much fuller reach than the usual insistence on op-
timization.
It is sometimes presumed that the problem can be avoided by looking at
expected values, with probability-weighted valuations. Indeed, this can of-
ten work well enough. However, for it to make sense, the choice of proba-
bility weights needs justiﬁcation, as does the axiomatically demanding
framework of expected value reasoning. These issues have been extensively
discussed elsewhere, and I shall not go further into them here.
15 The use of
partial ordering and maximization can be sometimes supplemented by the
device of probability distributions and expected value optimization, but the
extension may be purchased at some real cost.
The helpfulness of assuming complete knowledge, or less demandingly
(but demandingly enough) the usability of expected value reasoning, cannot
be doubted. What is at issue is whether substantially important decisional
concerns get neglected because of these presumptions. I ﬂag the question
as important but will not further pursue this issue here.
C. Noniterative and Nonparametric Valuations
Valuational judgments we make can take various forms. One distinction
relates to judgments that are basic in the sense that they are not parasitic
on any underlying factual presumption (other than those which are part of
the subject matter of the judgment itself). Nonbasic judgments may, how-
ever, draw on factual presumptions, often made in an implicit way, and thus
remain subject to revision in the light of more knowledge—indeed even in
the light of the results of applying these nonbasic judgments themselves.
16
When dealing with nonbasic judgments, say, in valuational weights, we
have to be aware that the valuational priorities may undergo alteration as
the implications of the presumed weights become more fully known or un-
14 The practical bearing of such variations is discussed in Sen, Employment, Technology
and Development, supra note 4; and Amartya Sen, Resources, Values and Development, es-
says 12, 14, & 17 (1982).
15 See Mark J. Machina, ‘‘Rational’’ Decision Making versus ‘‘Rational’’ Decision Mod-
elling? 24 J. Mathematical Psychology 163 (1981); Daniel Kahneman, P. Slovik, & A. Tver-
sky, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982). I have tried to discuss the
issues involved in Amartya Sen, Rationality and Uncertainty, 18 Theory & Decision 109
(1985).
16 The distinction between ‘‘basic’’ and ‘‘nonbasic’’ judgments is discussed in Sen, supra
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derstood. For example, we may not fully seize the implications of choosing
one set of values over another, until we see the results of using that set of
values. This suggests the need for iterative exercises of valuation, for exam-
ple, through the procedure of parametric programming. Rather than taking
the weights given as unalterable entities, they could be offered as tentative
values, which remain open to revision as and when the results of using
those values become clear. Then, instead of having a one-way sequence of
valuation, we could proceed from tentative values to the applied results and
then rethink as to whether the weights need revising in the light of the gen-
erated rankings of alternatives.
In some cases we have clearer values on particular elements in the list
of beneﬁts than we have on overall assessments of total happenings. In
other cases, however, the overall assessments may speak more immediately
to us, in terms of the valuations that we may entertain. Examples are easy
to give of both kinds of judgments from the recent literature on contingent
valuation as applied to environmental interventions.17 The format of cost-
beneﬁt analysis allows iterative valuation and parametric techniques, even
though the mainstream applications go relentlessly in one direction only.
Again, the pragmatic convenience of suppressing iterative determination of
weights has to be balanced against the practical importance of two-way in-
ﬂuences on the nature of elementary valuations and their integrated effects.
V. Evaluative Indifferences
A. Nonvaluation of Actions, Motives, and Rights
In the context of discussing broad consequential evaluation, there was
already an opportunity of commenting on the inclusiveness of consequential
reasoning, such as taking note of the nature of actions and the fulﬁllment
and violation of recognized rights. Motives too can come into the account-
ing, even though they are more important in personal decisions than in pub-
lic choice.
18
The neglect of these considerations in mainstream cost-beneﬁt analysis
does reduce the reach of the ethical analysis underlying public decisions.
The literature on human rights brings out how strongly relevant—and
closely related—some of these concerns are to what people see as impor-
tant. These concerns remain potentially pertinent to cost-beneﬁt evaluation
17 See, among many other writings, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment (Jerry
A. Hausman ed. 1993); Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch, Contingent Valuation and the
Value of Public Goods, 22 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 90 (1992); W. Michael Hanemann, Valu-
ing the Environment through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 19 (Autumn 1994).
18 On this see Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (1970).944 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
even when people have no opportunity of expressing their valuations of
these concerns in limited models of cost-beneﬁt assessment (for example,
in terms of market-price-based evaluations).
B. Indifference to Intrinsic Value of Freedom
The neglect of the freedoms that people enjoy is no less serious a limita-
tion than the neglect of rights. Indeed, recognized rights often tend to take
the form of claims on others for compliance—or even help—in favor of
the realization of the freedoms or liberties of the persons involved. These
entitlements may take the form of cospeciﬁed perfect obligations of particu-
lar individuals or agencies, or—more standardly in the case of many of the
claims of human rights—imperfect obligations of people or agencies who
are generally in a position to help.19
It is possible for consequential cost-beneﬁt analysis to take note of the
substantive freedoms that people have (formally this will require valuation
of opportunity sets, and not merely of the chosen alternatives). This can be
an important distinction. For example, a person who voluntarily fasts
(rather than involuntarily starves) is rejecting the option of eating, but to
eliminate the option of eating would make nonsense of the voluntariness of
his choice. Fasting is quintessentially an act of choosing to starve, and the
elimination of the option of eating robs the person of the opportunity of
choice that makes sense of the ‘‘sacriﬁce’’ involved in fasting.
The case for consequential analysis based on comprehensive outcomes
(taking note of processes used and freedoms exercised, as opposed to
merely culmination outcomes) closely relates to this question and to the ex-
tensive reach of consequential reasoning.
20 Insofar as the restricted format
of mainstream cost-beneﬁt analysis neglects the importance of freedom,
there is a manifest limitation here, and the contrast with a more general con-
sequential approach is clear enough. On the other hand, the practical conve-
nience of allowing that neglect may be very easy to see. It is not crucial
that we agree on what exactly is to be done (whether to go for the more
19 Both ‘‘perfect’’ and ‘‘imperfect’’ obligations are Kantian concepts, even though modern
Kantians seem to focus much more on the former than on the latter. Indeed, the view that
human rights may not be properly formulated ‘‘rights’’ of any kind seems to relate to the
idea that rights must be matched by perfect duties and it is not adequate to link them to
imperfect and more general obligations of others. See, for example, Onora O’Neill, Towards
Justice and Virtue (1996). A contrary position is defended in Amartya Sen, Development as
Freedom, ch. 10 (1999); and also in Sen, supra note 6.
20 On this see Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica 495 (1993);
Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 Econometrica 745 (1997); Amartya
Sen, Freedom and Social Choice, in Freedom, Reasoning and Social Choice: Arrow Lectures
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inclusive but more difﬁcult approach, or the opposite), but it is quite impor-
tant to see what the debate is about (and indeed that there is a debate here
to be faced, which many exponents of the limited mainstream methodology
seem rather reluctant to acknowledge).
C. Instrumental View of Behavioral Values
Values inﬂuence our actions, and in assessing the consequences of public
projects, valuational assumptions are standardly made. But it is also the
case that substantial projects, particularly those involving cultural chal-
lenges and also movements of people from one cultural setting to another
(for example, from rural to urban areas), may tend to lead to modiﬁcation
of values.
21 This opens up a big issue as to how such value modiﬁcations
are to be assessed and, in particular, in terms of which values—the prior or
the posterior beliefs—the evaluation should occur.
The issue, though enormously complicated, has received attention from
some social analysts.22 I do not have a great solution to offer here, but if a
serious problem is neglected—even if for the excellent reason of our not
knowing how to go about dealing with it—it is right that the neglect should
be ﬂagged. It may conceivably turn out to be rather relevant in our deci-
sional analysis, even if only for the reason that it may make us more modest
about insisting on the unquestionable excellence of the advocated decisions.
VI. Market-Centered Valuation
A. Reliance on Willingness to Pay
In mainstream cost-beneﬁt analysis, the primary work of valuation is
done by the use of willingness to pay. This approach is, of course, based
on the rationale of the discipline of market valuation. Indeed, the use of
valuations based on a market analogy has some of the merits that the mar-
ket allocation system itself has, including sensitivity to individual prefer-
ences and tractability of relative weights.
The basic limitations of this approach include those experienced also by
market signaling. There is, for example, the neglect of distributional issues,
both (1) in the form of attaching the same weight on everyone’s dollars
21 It is, however, important to distinguish between genuine changes in values and those
that reﬂect alterations of relative weights because of parametric variations of the determining
variables; on this see Gary S. Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976); and
Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1996).
22 See, for example, Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irratio-
nality (1979); and Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (1983).946 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
(irrespective of the poverty or the opulence of the persons involved), and
(2) in the shape of not attaching any weight to distributional changes re-
sulting from the project or program (since those changes, even if valued
positively or negatively by the citizens, are not up for valuation as a private
good in the market system).23 There are also signaling difﬁculties when
there are interdependences and externalities.
In addition to shared problems of (i) the actual market system and
(ii) market analogy valuation, the latter has some additional problems as
well. This applies particularly to public goods, where valuations based on
market analogy have often been invoked. Getting people to reveal what
they are really willing to pay is not all that easy, when the question is not
followed by an actual demand for that payment. And when it is so followed,
there are also strategic considerations that may distort the revealed willing-
ness to pay, for various reasons, of which free riding is perhaps the most
well known. There are, of course, proposed devices to deal with incentive
compatibility in implementation, but no general sureﬁre method has
emerged.
Estimation of willingness to pay is particularly hard in the case of contin-
gent valuation of existence values of prized components of the environ-
ment—a centrally important exercise for cost-beneﬁt analysis. The contin-
gent valuation (CV) procedure takes the form of posing hypothetical
questions about how much people would be willing to pay to prevent the
loss of some particular object.
24 In the legal context, dealing with damage
caused by oil spillage and other such acts, the contingent valuation ap-
proach has tended to be used as both (1) a measure of the actual loss in-
volved and (2) an indication of the extent of culpability of the party whose
negligence (or worse) led to the event that occurred.
The actual use of the CV procedure in devised experiments has tended
to yield results that seem to go contrary to what is standardly seen as ratio-
nal choice.
25 One of the problems—the so-called embedding effect—is il-
lustrated by the ﬁnding that the average willingness to pay to prevent 2,000
migratory birds being killed was much the same as the willingness to pay
23 The weights are sometimes interpreted not directly in terms of their actual and immedi-
ate consequences, but in terms of their potential use, as reﬂected in compensations tests of
one kind or another. I comment on this line of interpretation in the next section (Section
VIB).
24 The question can also be put in the form of how much one would accept as compensa-
tion for the loss. This should tend to exceed—for good ‘‘Hicksian’’ reasons—the willingness
to pay to prevent the loss. But the actual margins of difference in the answers to the two sets
of questions have tended to be much too large to be readily explainable in this way.
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for preventing the destruction of 20,000 or 200,000 birds.
26 Had those birds
been a threatened species, this set of choices need not have been so hard to
follow, since each option may be seen as containing the ‘‘valuable’’ thing
of continuity of that species (the people involved are perhaps not valuing
anything else). However, the birds in question were not of the threatened
type. It is, in fact, hard to judge what choices are or are not consistent or
irrational, without going in some detail into the way the choosers see the
problem and what they think they are trying to achieve.27 I shall return to
this question presently when discussing the requirements of a social choice
formulation of the problem, as opposed to a market analogy valuation.
B. Sufﬁciency of Potential Compensation
It is possible to interpret aggregates of willingness to pay in terms of the
potential possibility of redistribution, including the compensation of any
loss that some people may suffer. Given certain assumptions, such compen-
sational interpretations do indeed have some plausibility. The question,
however, is the relevance and persuasive power of ethical reasoning based
not on actual outcomes but on potential compensational possibilities that
may or may not be actually used.
There is a real motivational tension in the use of the logic of compensa-
tion for reading social welfare. If compensations are actually paid, then of
course we do not need the compensation criterion, since the actual outcome
already includes the paid compensations and can be judged without refer-
ence to compensation tests (in the case of Kaldor-Hicks criterion, after
compensations have been paid, the result will be a case of a simple Pareto
improvement). On the other hand, if compensations are not paid, it is not
at all clear in what sense it can be said that this is a social improvement
(‘‘Don’t worry, my dear loser, we can compensate you fully, and the fact
that we don’t have the slightest intention of actually paying this compensa-
tion makes no difference; it is merely a difference in distribution’’). The
compensation tests are either redundant or unconvincing.
28
The assistance that cost-beneﬁt analysis has sought from compensation
26 See William H. Desvousge et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contin-
gent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in Hausman ed., supra note 17.
27 On this see Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, supra note 20; and Amartya
Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market
Analogy, 46 Japanese Econ. Rev. 23 (1995).
28 On this see Amartya Sen, The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons, 17 J. Econ.
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tests has not been particularly well reasoned. This does not, however, oblit-
erate the merits of the approach of willingness to pay (without the odd use
of compensational logic). No matter how the requirements of efﬁciency are
speciﬁed, there is need for sensitivity to individual preferences, and in this
willingness to pay would have a role. If, in a case without externality, a
person is willing to pay far less for A than for B, then to give that person
B rather than A, when either can be given to her, would involve a loss. This
much can be acknowledged even without addressing the distributional issue
(since the Pareto criterion is adequate here), and such subchoices will be
typically embedded in larger choices (incorporating distributional issues as
well).29 So the information involved in the willingness to pay has some rele-
vance to efﬁciency, no matter how anemic may be the equity conclusions
drawn from it through the hallowed compensation tests. We must not
grumble against small mercies, but nor need we dress them up as large tri-
umphs.
C. Disregard of Social Choice Options
It was discussed earlier that market-centered valuation has ambiguities
especially when it comes to interpreting what people say they are ready to
pay for public goods, including environmental preservation and existence
values. In this context, it may be useful to ask what kind of social choice
interpretation underlies the contingent valuation procedure.
30 The philoso-
phy behind contingent valuation seems to lie in the idea that an environ-
mental good can be seen in essentially the same way as a normal private
commodity that we purchase and consume. The valuation that is thus ex-
pressed is that of achieving single-handedly—this is crucial—this environ-
mental beneﬁt. Consider, for example, a case in which it is inquired how
much I would pay to save all the living creatures that perished as a result
of the Exxon Valdez disaster, and I say $20. As interpreted in CV, it is now
presumed that if $20 paid by me would wipe out altogether all these losses,
then I am ready to make that payment. It is hard to imagine that this ques-
tion and answer can be taken seriously by any practical person (with some
idea of what the Exxon Valdez disaster produced), since the state of affairs
I am asked to imagine could not possibly be true. (Indeed, if I were really
to believe that my $20 can on its own clear up the mess created by the
29 On this see Amartya Sen, Real National Income, 43 Rev. Econ. Stud. 19 (1976); re-
printed in Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Harvard Univ. Press 1997)
(1982).
30 The discussion that follows draws on Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice,
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Exxon Valdez disaster, then I am not sure any importance should be
attached to what I do think.)
The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, formulated by
Kenneth Arrow in Social Choice and Individual Values, states that in mak-
ing choices over the relevant alternatives (that is, over the alternative states
in the actual opportunity set), the social choice should not depend on our
valuation of irrelevant alternatives (that is, the ones not in the opportunity
set).31 The imagined state of affairs in which I have paid $20 and all the
losses from the Exxon Valdez spill are gone is certainly not a relevant alter-
native, since it is just not feasible, but somehow our valuation of that irrele-
vant alternative is being made here into the central focus of attention in
choosing between actually feasible alternatives—relevant for the choice.
The very idea that I treat the prevention of an environmental damage just
like buying a private good is itself quite absurd. The amount I am ready to
pay for my toothpaste is typically not affected by the amount you pay for
yours. But it would be amazing if the payment I am ready to make to save
nature is totally independent of what others are ready to pay for it, since it
is speciﬁcally a social concern. The ‘‘lone ranger’’ model of environmental
evaluation—central to the interpretation of CV valuation—confounds the
nature of the problem at hand. We have no escape from having to use valu-
ations derived from other methods of information gathering, such as ques-
tionnaires that describe the social states more fully.
Some have argued, with considerable cogency, that even though the for-
mal question in the CV questionnaire refers to what each would pay alone
to save that bit of nature, the answers are best interpreted as if they had
been asked how much they would contribute in a joint effort to achieve that
result.
32 It does indeed require much less willing suspension of disbelief to
answer this allegedly de facto question seriously than the question that is
actually asked. But it raises other difﬁculties. What I am willing to contrib-
ute must, given the nature of the task, depend on how much I expect others
to contribute. There could be effects in different directions. I may be willing
to contribute something if others also do, making this an assurance game.
33
On the other hand, I may feel a less pressing need to do something myself
if others are in any case going to do a lot and my own sacriﬁce could make
little difference to the social object in question (this is one route toward free
31 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951).
32 See, for example, Daniel Kahneman et al., Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods:
A Psychological Perspective, 4 Psychological Sci. 310 (1993).
33 On assurance games, see Amartya Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Dis-
count, 81 Q. J. Econ. 112 (1967); and Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, Economics and
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riding). If the lone-ranger model of CV is tightly speciﬁed but incredible,
the contribution model is credible but severely underspeciﬁed.34
How might we make better use of the social choice approach to interpret
this valuational issue?
35 One requirement would be to make sure that the
individuals consider the actual alternative states from which the social
choice is to be made. Properly devised questionnaires can easily achieve
that. This is where the market analogy is particularly deceptive, since the
market does not provide speciﬁed social states to the individuals to choose
from. Given the prices, I choose my basket of commodities, and you choose
yours; neither has to look beyond our nose. There are many problems for
which all this works extremely well, but environmental evaluation is not
one of them. In order to get people’s views on what is to be done, they have
to be told what the real alternatives are, involving speciﬁcation of what will
be done by the others. This is not the language of market valuation, nor a
part of its epistemic probe. It requires speciﬁcation of particular proposals
of actions to be undertaken, with articulation of the actions of others as well
(including contributions to be made by them). Valuation of social states is
a part of a standard social choice exercise, but not of a market valuation
exercise. The market analogy is particularly deceptive in this case since it
does not deal with social alternatives.
VII. Concluding Remarks
To conclude, cost-beneﬁt analysis is a very general discipline, with some
basic demands—expressed here in the form of foundational principles—
that establish an approach but not a speciﬁc method. Even these elementary
demands would be resisted by those who would like a different general ap-
proach, involving, say, implicit valuation (rather than explicit articulation)
or the use of pure deontological principles (rather than broadly consequen-
tial evaluation). There are also technical issues in the strategic use of addi-
tivity (despite the plausibility of concave objectives). However, even with
these various foundational demands (I have tried to defend them, up to a
34 There is a further difﬁculty in using the willingness to pay for ‘‘existence value’’ be-
cause of a problem in interpreting why a person is willing to pay a certain amount in order
to try and achieve the continued existence of a threatened object. As Eric Posner has pointed
out to me, if the payment offered comes not from the person’s own expectation of beneﬁt
but from a sense of ‘‘commitment’’ (a commitment she has to try to bring about the contin-
ued existence of the threatened object), then the logic of interpreting the sum total of willing-
ness to pay by all who promise to pay cannot be easily seen as the aggregate beneﬁt they
receive altogether.
35 On this issue see Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice, supra note 27. See
also the papers included in Social Choice Re-examined (Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, &
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point), the approach of cost-beneﬁt analysis is rather permissive and can be
adopted by many warring factions in the ﬁeld of public decisions.
Divisiveness increases as additional requirements are imposed, including
structural demands and evaluative indifferences. There are gains and
losses—the gains mainly in convenience and usability and losses mainly in
the reach of the evaluative exercise. I have tried to indicate what the pros
and cons are. While the mainstream procedures tend to incorporate all these
requirements, it is easy to see how some of these demands may be dropped
in a particular procedure of valuation.
The mainstream approach of cost-beneﬁt analysis not only takes on the
foundational principles, the structural demands, and the evaluative indiffer-
ences, but also uses a very special method of valuation through direct use
of, or in analogy with, the logic of market allocation. This market-centered
approach is sometimes taken (particularly by its advocates) to be the only
approach of cost-beneﬁt analysis. That claim is quite arbitrary, but given
the importance of this approach, I have devoted a good deal of this paper
to scrutinizing that approach in particular.
The market analogy has merits in the case of many public projects, par-
ticularly in providing sensitivity to individual preferences, relevant for ef-
ﬁciency considerations (in one form or another). Its equity claims are, how-
ever, mostly bogus, even though they can be made more real if explicit
distributional weights are introduced (as they standardly are not in the
mainstream approach).
36 The use of compensation tests suffers from the
general problem that they are either redundant or entirely unconvincing.
Even the efﬁciency claims of the mainstream approach are severely com-
promised in the case of many public goods, and much would depend on the
nature of the valuations in question. There are particular difﬁculties with
environmental valuations, especially existence values. In this case, the valu-
ational demands of social choice are easy to see, but not easy to reveal
through the device of willingness to pay. The speciﬁcation of social states
that is needed for intelligent valuation (including the identiﬁcation of who
will do what) is simply not provided by the market-based questioning (ei-
ther in the form ‘‘How much would you pay, if you could single-handedly
bring about the environmental change?’’ or in the form ‘‘How much would
you contribute, assuming whatever you want to assume as to what others
are doing?’’). The spectacular merit of the informational economy of the
market system for private goods ends up being a big drag when more infor-
mation is needed than the market analogy can offer.
36 See, however, Dasgupta, Marglin, & Sen, supra note 9, for examples of techniques that
combine willingness to pay with distributional weights (as well as recognition of ‘‘merit
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When all the requirements of ubiquitous market-centered evaluation have
been incorporated into the procedures of cost-beneﬁt analysis, it is not so
much a discipline as a daydream. If, however, the results are tested only in
terms of internal consistency, rather than by their plausibility beyond the
limits of the narrowly chosen system, the glaring defects remain hidden and
escape exposure. Daydreams can be very consistent indeed. Sensible cost-
beneﬁt analysis demands something beyond the mainstream method, in par-
ticular, the invoking of explicit social choice judgments that take us beyond
market-centered valuation. The exponents of the mainstream need not face
much questioning from the deontologists (who will not speak to them), but
they do have to address the questions that other cost-beneﬁt analysts raise.
The debate may be, in a sense, ‘‘internal,’’ but it is no less intense for that
reason.